ous about finding some limit on the power to regulate commerce among the states. It is, therefore, well worth considering whether the narrow view of the Commerce Clause held by the Progressive Era Supreme Court, by Justice Thomas, as well as by Albert Abel, Richard Epstein, and Raoul Berger is as "historically unsound" as Nelson and Pushaw contend.
While I agree with much in Nelson and Pushaw's nuanced article, 6 I will present evidence here that strongly indicates that they, Crosskey, and Hamilton and Adair are wrong with respect to the original meaning of the term "commerce" in the Commerce Clause. Indeed, when I first read Hamilton and Adair and Crosskey, alongside Nelson and Pushaw's endorsement of their work, I too was persuaded that "commerce" meant any "gainful activity"-until I had a chance to survey the records of the Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates for myself. When I did, I found to my surprise that the term "commerce" was consistently used in the narrow sense and that there is no surviving example of it being used in either source in any broader sense. The same holds true for the use of the word "commerce" in The Federalist Papers.
Upon discovering this, I returned to The Power to Govern and noticed for the first time that Hamilton and Adair omitted any reference to the use of the term "commerce" in the Philadelphia or ratification conventions, though they offered evidence from these sources for other claims!' I was not surprised that Crosskey had omitted this evidence since he explicitly signaled his intention to ignore evidence from the drafting process. "The samples of word-usage and juristic and political discussion ... will ... all be drawn ... from sources not connected with the Constitution." Only after examining this evidence, exceeded the powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause).
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In particular, I agree with Nelson and Pushaw that even the broadest original meaning of the Commerce Clause that can be justified historically is still far narrower than the power the Supreme Court currently allows Congress to exercise. See Nelson and Pushaw, 85 Iowa L Rev at 119-72 (cited in note 11). I do not accept, however, all the doctrines they recommend for applying this broader, but still not limitless, conception of the Commerce Clause to actual cases and controversies-for example, their view that Congress may regulate any activity that "affects" commerce between more states than one, or the extreme deference they would give towards a congressional assessment of these effects. See id at 110-11.
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For example, Hamilton and Adair use evidence from the ratification conventions to define the terms "traffic" and "trade." Hamilton and Adair, The Power to Govern at 54 & n 37
(cited in note 15).The authors also use evidence from the ratifying conventions to argue that the states approved the use of the taxing power to regulate. Id at 121-27.
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William Winslow Crosskey, 1 Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States 5 (Chicago 1953). Crosskey defends this method as follows:
For, by using such materials, a dictionary can be made which will not, it is conceived, be open to the many natural suspicions that arise from the known or suspected political bias of speakers and writers on the Constitution. And in consequence of this, it should lead to con-however, did I discover just how convenient this deliberate omission was for Crosskey's thesis. Unfortunately, Nelson and Pushaw do not fill this gap.
After discussing the evidence concerning the meaning of "commerce," I will present evidence on the meaning of the terms "among the states" and "To regulate." Here I am in more agreement with Nelson and Pushaw, who seem to endorse a narrower interpretation of the original meaning of these terms," though I greatly disagree with their doctrinal implementation-or construction-of these aspects of the Commerce Clause.
Before attempting any of this, it is necessary to distinguish "original meaning" from "original intent" as methods of originalist interpretation. This distinction will assist in understanding why the evidence of meaning I present here is significant and why it is not undermined fatally by the contrary evidence relied upon by Nelson and Pushaw, Hamilton and Adair, and Crosskey. And it is also important to distinguish interpretation from construction so as to avoid asking too much of the former, or confusing the former with the latter.
I. ORIGINAL MEANING AND INTERPRETATION
A. Original Meaning vs. Intent
As I have explained elsewhere," "original meaning" refers to the meaning a reasonable speaker of English would have attached to the words, phrases, sentences, etc. at the time the particular provision was adopted. It is originalist because it disregards any change to that meaning that may have occurred in the intervening years. It is objective insofar as it looks to the public meaning conveyed by the words used in the Constitution, rather than to the subjective intentions of its framers or ratifiers. By contrast, "original intent" refers to the goals, objectives, or purposes of those who wrote or ratified the text. These intentions could have been publicly known-or hidden behind a veil of secrecy.They could and indeed were likely to be in conflict.
In sum, to use what Ronald Dworkin characterizes as a "crucial distinction," 3 ' original meaning refers to "what some officials intended stitutional conclusions having a very high and singular cogency Id at [5] [6] . 29 See, for example, Nelson and Pushaw, 85 Iowa L Rev at 42-49 (cited in note 11) ("Although Crosskey's interpretation is defensible, he did not marshall evidence strong enough to overcome the presumption that the regulation of commerce, like all federal power, dots not extend to purely internal state affairs."). 30 The argument presented in this section is substantially elaborated and defended in Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loyola L Rev 611 (1999) . 31 Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation" Federal Courts to say in enacting the language they used," whereas original intent refers to "what they intended-or expected or hoped-would be the consequences of their saying it."'' If publicly known and widely accepted, these original intentions could have shaped the original meaning of terms and, for this reason, they are not completely immaterial to an originalist analysis. But, at best, evidence of the framers' and ratifiers' intentions (as distinct from evidence of how they used the words they used) is circumstantial evidence of meaning while at worst it can distract from the words of the document that were actually employed. The method to be preferred depends on one's normative rationale for originalism. Those who believe that we must pay attention to the framers or ratifiers because they were somehow authorized (by consent or something else) to issue binding commands to the rest of the population and to their posterity may want, for this reason, to determine the intentions or objectives that lie behind their words. In contrast, those who believe that the actions of the ratifiers established a rule of law that is binding if its content is "good enough" to be legitimate 3 3 would want to use a writing to "lock-in" that meaning and, once locked in, adhere to it unless and until it is changed in writing. In short, a commitment to original intention originalism stems from the legitimacy of the founders as command givers. In contrast, a commitment to original meaning originalism need not be based on this rationale, but instead may stem from the legitimacy of the original commands themselves and the fact these commands were made in writing. A commitment to original meaning is, then, a crucial part of the commitment to a written constitution.
Original meaning originalism circumscribes the relevance of various types of historical evidence the way the objective theory of contract restricts the evidence relevant to determine the meaning of a written contract. With written constitutions, as with contracts, we want evidence of what the terms meant in the particular context of the written text at issue, whether a provision in the original Constitution or a later amendment. As Richard Posner has put the matter:
and the Law 115,116 (Princeton 1997) (Amy Gutmann, ed). 32 Id. 33 By "legitimate" I mean a lawmaking process capable of producing laws that bind the citizenry in conscience. See Barnett, 45 Loyola L Rev at 636-43 (cited in note 30) (discussing original meaning and constitutional legitimacy); Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative. The Role of Natural Rights in Constitutional Adjudication, 12 Const Commen 93, 98-99 (1995) . I will greatly expand upon this analysis in a work-in-progress entitled The Presumption of Liberty: Natural Rights and the Constitution. With original meaning, then, more "historical context" is not automatically preferred. To the contrary, originalism requires a limited focus on certain types of evidence of historical meaning: that evidence that most clearly indicates the public meaning of the text that is being interpreted at the time it was adopted. When it comes to determining original usage, dictionary definitions provide a useful start, but we must also immediately examine any clues to meaning provided in the document itself since any context it provides would directly influence the specific meaning perceived by the public when reading this text. After all, the document was far more accessible to the general public than any particular discussion of it. And it is the document that was adopted as law, not the statements of people about the document.
Where the document itself does not settle the matter, extrinsic evidence of how persons used words when discussing the particular text at issue will further narrow the scope of possible meanings. 5 And 35 Posner, 67 U Chi L Rev at 595 (cited in note 10).Why Judge Posner does not think Justice Thomas's concurrence in Lopez fits this description of originalism is not clear to me and Posner does not attempt to explain his characterization. But if it truly is -law office history," though I disagree, then Justice Thomas happened to hit upon a conclusion that is well justified by the type of originalist inquiry that Posner seems to endorse. 36 We are confronted here with a "parol evidence rule"-type problem. How can we bz sure what the meaning of a passage was unless we examine extrinsic evidence to determine the range of possible meanings it might have had? This is a good reason to consult evidence of usage found in dictionaries or in the drafting and ratification conventions. But once e%idence of alternative possibilities is thereby revealed, we must then return to the text to see if the context it provides the more closely in time these discussions are to the document's adoption, the less likely is the chance either that the meaning of words has changed, or the speaker is seeking to deviate from the original meaning of the text. Thus, evidence of usage in the Philadelphia and state ratification conventions illuminates the original meaning of the text, provided that this usage is not shown to be secret or unknown to the general public.
Of course, where evidence of meaning closely linked to drafting and ratification is missing or inadequate, we may need to cast a wider net. In addition, evidence removed from the immediate process of drafting and ratification can confirm our evaluation of more relevant evidence or provoke us to take a closer look at what we thought was clear evidence of original meaning. But it would be improper to let conflicting evidence either before or after drafting and ratification in any way trump evidence of a clear public meaning that existed during this process.
B. Interpretation vs. Construction
It is important to keep in mind that originalism is warranted as a theory of interpretation-that is, as a method of determining the meaning of the words written in the Constitution. For better or worse, knowing the meaning of these words only takes us so far in resolving current cases and controversies. Due either to ambiguity or vagueness, the original meaning of the text may not always determine a unique rule of law to be applied to a particular case or controversy. While not indeterminate, the original meaning can be "underdeterminate."" Indeed, because the framers frequently used abstract language, this will often be the case. When this happens, interpretation must be supplemented by constitutional construction-within the bounds established by original meaning. In this manner, construction fills the unavoidable gaps in constitutional meaning when interpretation has reached its limits.
Keith Whittington distinguishes interpretation from construction in the following manner:
Constitutional interpretation is essentially legalistic, but constitutional construction is essentially political. Its precondition is that parts of the constitutional text have no discoverable meaning. Alexcludes some of these possibilities or affirms others. If so, then the extrinsic evidence cannot be used to contradict the text. If not, extrinsic evidence may be used to clarify otherwise ambiguous passages, provided it is evidence of the contemporary meaning of the text being interpreted. [68:101
HeinOnline --68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 108 2001 though the clauses and structures that make up the text cannot be simply empty of meaning, for they are clearly recognizable as language, the meaning that they do convey may be so broad and underdetermined as to be incapable of faithful reduction to legal rules .... Regardless of the extent of judicial interpretation of certain aspects of the Constitution, there will remain an impenetrable sphere of meaning that cannot be simply discovered. The judiciary may be able to delimit textual meaning, hedging in the possibilities, but after all judgments have been rendered specifying discoverable meaning, major indeterminacies may remain. The specification of a single governing meaning from these possibilities requires an act of creativity beyond interpretation.... This additional step is the construction of meaning. He then offers a very long list of constitutional constructions adopted either by courts in their opinions or by the other branches of government in legislation or executive orders that fill the gaps in the original meaning of the text and help "transform constitutional theory into constitutional practice."' ' Though the process of constitutional construction fills the gaps within original meaning, I do not share Whittington's characterization of the process of construction as "political," insofar as this term implies that construction is necessarily and always political. Use of that phrase also connotes a completely open-ended choice unguided by constitutional principle. That is not, I think, even Whittington's conception of constitutional construction. Rather, there is often a gap between abstract or general principles of the kind found in the Constitution and the rules of law that are needed to put these principles into 38 Keith E.Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review 7 (Kansas 1999). See also Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning 1-19 (Harvard 1999) (discussing interpretation and construction, and arguing that construction is necessary because constitutional interpretation cannot answer every constitutional question).
39 Whittington, Constitutional Construction at 8, 12 (cited in note 38). Whittington groups constructions into seven categories and I shall just give one example of each (without commenting on whether I think it is warranted): (1) organic structures-specification of the size of the Supreme Court; (2) delegation and distribution of political powers-judicial refusal to issue advisory opinions; (3) individual and collective rights-no right to secession: (4) structures of political participationlcitizenship-specification of a single date for national elections; (5) jurisdiction-state annexation through treaty; (6) domestic government role-national bankruptcy lawand (7) international posture-entrance into NATO. Each of these actions by one or more branches of the government fleshes out how the government is "constituted" in ways that are not specified in the written Constitution. For the entire list of Whittington's examples, see id at 12. Note that in several instances he lists constructions that oppose each other, for example,-federal incorporation of banks" and "no federal incorporation of banks." Id.
action. ' 0 This does not mean, however, that the choice of rules is unguided by the abstract or general principles that can be ascertained by interpretation.
Many parts of the Constitution are rule-like and can often be applied directly to cases without need of intermediate doctrine. 1 Other provisions are abstract and general and require some choice among possible ways of putting them into effect. ' Still other provisions explicitly refer to standards or principles that lie outside the text and therefore authorize supplementation of the text by other materials.
4
When, for these reasons, the terms of the Constitution cannot directly be applied to resolve a particular dispute, some construction, as opposed to interpretation, of constitutional meaning is required. As Whittington observes, constructions operate "where the text is so broad or so underdetermined as to be incapable of faithful but exhaustive reduction to legal rules."" Constitutional constructions, then, are not wholly "political." The choices among possible constructions, while not dictated by original meaning interpretation, can be and often are limited by that meaning. In this way, constitutional constructions, though not identical with the text nor deduced immediately from it, are not unconnected or unconstrained by the text. The text provides what Frederick Schauer has called a "frame" that excludes many constructions without determining one unique construction that would put into action the general principles it enunciates. "The language of a [constitutional] clause, whether seemingly general or seemingly specific, establishes a boundary, or a frame, albeit a frame with fuzzy edges. Even though the language itself does not tell us what goes on within the frame, it does tell us when we have gone outside it.' Therefore, though by definition constructions are not in the Constitution, they can be of the Constitution.
Apart from revealing the limits of interpretation, the distinction between interpretation and construction also helps us to understand the differing appeals of original meaning and original intent originalism. The former looks to original usage to determine the meaning of 40 See Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law 108-31 (Oxford 1998) (explaining why conventional rules of law are needed to put abstract and underdeterminate principles of justice into effect). 41 The oft-cited example is the Presidential age limit of thirty-five years in US Const Art II, § 1,c15.
42
See, for example, the phrase "cruel and unusual" in US Const Amend VIII. 43 Consider the Ninth Amendment's reference to unspecified "other[ I" rights "retained by the people." US Const Amend IX. 44 Whittington, Constitutional Construction at 5 (cited in note 38).
The Origizal Meaning of the Comnerce Clause the text, though this meaning may require construction due to ambiguity and vagueness. So long as we stay within the frame provided by the original meaning of the text, our choice of specific rules to decide cases may be influenced by other considerations, such as justice or precedent, depending on what it is we think makes a constitution binding. Some originalists, however, seek to go beyond the original meaning of the text to identify the specific constructions that would have been preferred or intended by the framers or ratifiers. Often this is done by "channeling the framers," that is, by hypothesizing what the framers would have intended had they been presented with the case at hand. I do not think that the normative case for original meaning originalism entails a commitment to construction according to the original intentions of the framers or ratifiers " This is not to deny that some of the founders might usefully be consulted to determine a construction that best fits the underlying principles of the constitution they wrote and approved. In this manner, the framers as the designers of the Constitution become our teachers rather than our wardens."
There is then an important distinction between determining the original meaning of text and construing that meaning, where it is vague or ambiguous, according to the original intentions of its drafters or ratifiers. In what follows, I present what I think is the best evidence of the original meaning of the Commerce Clause. How that meaning, once established, is to be construed is a different matter that I may touch upon in passing, but is not the primary focus of this Article.
II. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF "COMMERCE"
The Commerce Clause raises three questions that must be answered by interpretation, construction, or both: What is the meaning of "Commerce"? What is the meaning of "among the several States"? And what is the meaning of "To regulate"? The source of the scholarly debate lies in the fact that, unlike some other provisions of the Constitution, the evidence of "original intent, meaning, and understanding"'" is in conflict. This is because there was a clash of objectives among different supporters of the Constitution, not to mention a clash between supporters and opponents. And unlike other passages of the Constitution, each of the terms of the Commerce Power is said to have had, at 46 See Barnett, 45 Loyola L Rev at 611-14 (cited in note 30) (discussing the significant problems with "original intent" originalism while suggesting that the new originalism has "%irtu-ally triumphed over other interpretive techniques"). 47 See Randy E. Barnett, The Relevance of the Framers' Intent, 19 Han' J L & Pub Pol 403, 403 (1996) (distinguishing between the "framers as wardens" and the -framers as designers"). 48 Nelson and Pushaw, 85 Iowa L Rev at 13 (cited in note 11).
the time of the founding, both an expansive and more limited meaning in common discourse (though not, as we shall see, in the context of the drafting and ratifying of the Constitution). "Commerce" might be limited to trade or exchange of goods, which would exclude, for example, agriculture, manufacturing, and other methods of production, or it might expansively be interpreted to refer to any gainful activity. "To regulate" might be limited to "make regular," which would subject a particular type of commerce to a rule and would exclude, for example, any prohibition on trade as an end in itself, or it might expansively be interpreted to mean "to govern," which would include prohibitions as well as pure regulations. "[A]mong the several States" might be limited to commerce that takes place between the states (or between people of different states), as opposed to commerce that occurs between persons of the same state. Or "among the states" might expansively be interpreted to refer to commerce "among the people of the States," whether such commerce occurs between people in the same state or in different states.
Though it is often difficult to be sure of the meaning intended by a speaker from the context of a particular statement, there are good textual and contextual reasons to accept the narrower definition of each of these terms as their original meaning at the time of the founding. Because the meaning of the term "commerce" has been the most contentious, I will spend more time evaluating the evidence of its original meaning than that of the others.
I was surprised to find, given the degree of scholarly criticism of the narrow meaning, that the use of the term "commerce" in the drafting and ratification process was remarkably uniform. Indeed, I have found not a single example from the reports of these proceedings that unambiguously used the broad meaning of "commerce" and many instances where the context makes clear that the speaker intended a narrow meaning.
A. Originalist Sources
The text.
The first place to look for the original meaning of the text is the text itself, both the immediate text at issue and any other text in the Constitution that may shed light on the meaning of the relevant portion. In sum, does the Constitution serve as its own dictionary on the meaning of a particular word? When considering the meaning of the term "commerce," it is tempting to argue that "commerce" must mean trade, and not manufacturing or agriculture, because it would make no sense to refer to a congressional power "to regulate manufacturing with foreign nations" or "to regulate agriculture with Indian tribes."
The Original Meaning of the Coinierce Clause
This temptation should be resisted, however. For, if we plug the broadest meaning of "commerce"-that is, "gainful activity"-into the sentence so it reads Congress shall have power "to regulate gainful activity with foreign nations," the sentence makes perfect sense. While it is true that the clause would be referring only to that subset of gainful activity that can be conducted "with foreign nations" and "with the Indian tribes" and that this would exclude manufacturing and agriculture, this would not be due to any narrow meaning of "commerce," but because of the narrowing meaning of "with foreign nations" and "with Indian tribes." In other words, the word "commerce" could still be used in its broadest sense in a manner that does justice to the sentence as a whole. Therefore, while this sort of textual analysis may well reveal what the term "among the several States" means," it does not tell us in which sense, narrow or broad, the word "commerce" is being used in the Commerce Clause, and we must look elsewhere for guidance.
A bit more assistance is provided from the way "commerce" is used in Article I, Section 9, which reads: "No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another. . . ?' Here, as Richard Epstein has written, "[t]he term 'commerce' is used in opposition to the term 'revenue,' and seems clearly to refer to shipping and its incidental activities; this much seems evident from the use of the term 'port.'" Moreover, unlike the Commerce Clause, we cannot here comfortably substitute "gainful activity" for the term "commerce." "No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of gainful activity to the Ports of one State over those of another" is too awkward to be an accurate translation. But though in Article I, Section 9, the term "commerce" is, all by itselfC pretty clearly being used in a much narrower sense than "any gainful activity," we cannot be sure from this usage exactly what this sense is. For that we need to appeal to extrinsic evidence of original meaning that lies outside the four corners of the Constitution. 51 Epstein, 73 Va L Rev at 1395 (cited in note 19). 52 By this I mean the narrowing sense is not provided by some other phrase such as with foreign Nations." contrast, "manufacture" is defined as "1. The practice of making any piece of workmanship. 2. Any thing made by art."' "Agriculture" is defined as " [t] he art of cultivating the ground; tillage; husbandry, as distinct from pasturage."" If Johnson is accurate, commerce referred predominantly to exchange or trade as distinct from the agricultural or manufacturing production of those things that are subsequently traded. As Justice Thomas noted in his concurrence, Johnson's definition of "commerce" is borne out by other dictionaries of the time. It is also the usage most closely associated with the drafting and adoption of the Constitution.
Nelson and Pushaw acknowledge that "trade and exchange" is the core meaning of "commerce."' 57 The question is whether they are right to claim that "[a]bundant evidence demonstrates, however, that 'commerce' had other broader meanings, which a significant number of the Constitution's Framers and Ratifiers intended to incorporate."" While their evidence showed that a number of framers and ratifiers may have desired a government powerful enough to control all aspects of the national economy, the issue is whether the term "commerce" that was chosen to describe the powers of Congress conveyed that expansive meaning to those to whom it was addressed and whether the public statements of those who supported the Constitution and favored broad national powers reflected such a meaning. If "commerce" had been used in its broad sense, we would expect this usage to appear somewhere in the records of the Constitution's drafting and ratification. But no such example exists.
3. Constitutional Convention.
In Madison's notes for the Constitutional Convention, the term "commerce" appears thirty-four times in the speeches of the delegates. 9 Eight of these are unambiguous references to commerce with foreign nations which can only consist of trade. In every other instance, the terms "trade" or "exchange" could be substituted for the term "commerce" with the apparent meaning of the statement pre-1785). 
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See note 3. 57 See Nelson and Pushaw, 85 Iowa L Rev at 101 n 478 (cited in note 11) ("We readily concede that in the eighteenth century (1) the primary definition of 'commerce' was the one proffered by Thomas, Berger, and Epstein, and (2) some may have thought that this was the meaning conveyed in the Commerce Clause."). 58 Id.
59
This is apart from the sixteen times in which it appears in quotes from various proposals.
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served. In no instance is the term "commerce" clearly used to refer to "any gainful activity" or anything broader than trade. One congressional power proposed by Madison, but not ultimately adopted, suggests that the delegates shared the limited meaning of "commerce" described in Johnson's dictionary. Madison proposed to grant Congress the power "[t]o establish public institutions, rewards, and immunities for the promotion of agriculture, connzerce, trades and manufactures,"'O strongly suggesting that the members understood the term "commerce" to mean trade or exchange, distinct from the productive processes that made the things to be traded.
The Federalist Papers.
Nor was this a secret usage confined to the Convention. In several of his contributions to The Federalist Papers, ardent nationalist Alexander Hamilton repeatedly made clear the commonplace distinction between commerce or trade and production. In Federalist 11, he also explained the purpose of the Commerce Clause, a purpose entirely consistent with the prevailing "core" meaning of the term "commerce":
An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance the trade of each by an interchange of their respective productions, not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation to foreign markets. The veins of commerce in every part will be replenished and will acquire additional motion and vigor from a free circulation of the commodities of every part. Commercial enterprise will have much greater scope from the diversity in the productions of different Statese'
In Federalist 12, he referred to the "rivalship," now silenced, "between agriculture and commerce," ' while in Federalist 17, he distinguished between the power to regulate such national matters as commerce and "the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature, all those things, in short, which are proper to be provided for by local legislation."" In Federalist 21, Hamilton maintained that causes of the wealth of nations were of "an infinite variety," including "[s]ituation, soil, climate, the nature of the productions, the na- ture of the government, the genius of the citizens, the degree of information they possess, the state of commerce, of arts, of industry."' ' In Federalist 35, he asked, "Will not the merchant understand and be disposed to cultivate, as far as may be proper, the interests of the mechanic and manufacturing arts to which his commerce is so nearly allied?" 6 '
In none of the sixty-three appearances of the term "commerce" in The Federalist Papers is it ever used to unambiguously refer to any activity beyond trade or exchange. At the time of the framing, then, for Hamilton, a proponent of broad national powers, the term "commerce" in the Constitution referred to trade or exchange, not to the production of items to be traded, and certainly not to all gainful activity. Even later, with the contentiousness of the Constitution's adoption behind him, Hamilton's usage did not change. As Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton's official opinion to President Washington advocating a broad congressional power to incorporate a national bank repeatedly referred to Congress's power under the Commerce Clause as the power to regulate the "trade between the States."
Ratification conventions.
Having examined every use of the term "commerce" that appears in the reports of the state ratification conventions, I found that the term was uniformly used to refer to trade or exchange, rather than all gainful activity. Because people used this word to convey its accustomed meaning, they did not often define it or give contextual clues as to what they believed the term meant. Yet some of these public speeches make clear that "commerce" was used as a synonym for trade or exchange-and did not include agriculture, manufacturing, or other business-and every speech is consistent with such a meaning (though I will discuss two statements that can be misinterpreted as connoting a broader meaning of "commerce"). I shall present this evidence state by state.
In the records of the Massachusetts convention, the word "commerce" is used nineteen times-every use consistent with it meaning trade, mostly foreign trade; and no use clearly indicating a broader meaning. The most explicit distinction was made by Thomas Dawes, a prominent revolutionary and legislator, who began his discussion on the importance of the national taxation powers. "We have suffered," said he, "for want of such authority in the federal head. This will be evident if we take a short view of our agriculture, commerce, and manufactures." He then expounded at some length, giving separate attention to each of these activities and the beneficial effect the Constitution would have on them." Under the heading of "commerce," he referred to "our own domestic traffic that passes from state to state." ' Only two other speakers in the Massachusetts convention implicitly distinguished between "commerce" and other economic activities. Charles Turner referred to "the deplorable state of our navigation and commerce, and various branches of business thereon dependent."'9 And making much the same point, James Bowdoin of Boston argued that the existing confederation lacked the power to retaliate against foreign nations who placed restrictions on American exports:
Hence a decrease of our commerce and navigation, and the duties and revenue arising from them. Hence an insufficient demand for the produce of our lands, and the consequent discouragement of agriculture. Hence the inability to pay debts, and particularly taxes, which by that decrease are enhanced. And hence, as the necessary result of all these, the emigration of our inhabitants.
'
While each of these further consequences flowed from a decrease of "our commerce and navigation," they were not the same thing as commerce.
In the few fragments that survive of the Maryland, Connecticut, and New Hampshire ratification debates, the term "commerce" is mentioned only once. In the opening address to the Connecticut convention, Oliver Elsworth referred to the Swiss who "[t]ill lately," he said, "had neither commerce nor manufactures. They were merely a set of herdsmen." By contrast, in the more extensive records of the New York convention, the term appears thirty times. Governor Clinton referred to " [t] The New York delegate who repeatedly made the clearest distinction between commerce and other economic activity was Alexander Hamilton. As part of a lengthy speech, he observed: "The Southern States possess certain staples,-tobacco, rice, indigo, &c.,-which must be capital objects in treaties of commerce with foreign nations." The same distinction is implicit in his denial that the regulation of commerce was outside the competency of a central government: "What are the objects of the government? Commerce, taxation, &c. In order to comprehend the interests of commerce, is it necessary to know how wheat is raised, and in what proportion it is produced in one district and in another? By no means. ' 6 Later, in defending the power of direct taxation, Hamilton predicted that in its absence, the "general government ... will push imposts [on our commerce] to an extreme."" As a result, "[o]ur neighbors, not possessed of our advantages for commerce and agriculture, will become manufacturers: their property will, in a great measure, be vested in the commodities of their own productions; but a small proportion will be in trade or in lands. Thus, on the gentleman's scheme, they will be almost free from burdens, while we shall be loaded with them."
Although there is no example in New York of a clear use of "commerce" in any sense broader than trade or exchange, two statements might mistakenly be so interpreted. In one, Hamilton argued that "one man can be as fully acquainted with the general state of the commerce, manufactures, population, production, and common resources of a state, which are the proper objects of federal legislation."' Although here, as elsewhere, he uses the term "commerce" narrowly, this passage might be read to indicate that the entire list of activities fell within the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the states. Taken in context, this would be a misreading. Rather, Hamilton is contending here, as he did throughout his career and as did many others, that the advancement of all these economic activities was the proper goal of national legislation. He is not speaking of the specific means or powers granted to Congress by the Constitution to pursue 74 Idat336.
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The Orighial Meaning of the Conmzerce Clause these ends, such as the power of taxation and the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations or among the states.
Referring to the same problem of knowledge, antifederalist Melancton Smith asserted:
To understand the true commercial interests of a country, not only requires just ideas of the general commerce of the world, but also, and principally, a knowledge of the productions of your own country, and their value, what your soil is capable of producing, the nature of your manufactures, and the capacity of the country to increase both."
Although this statement employs the term "commercial interests" broadly, it still uses the narrow conception of "commerce" as distinct from "productions" and "manufactures" as included among these "commercial" interests.
Smith's statement is extremely useful because many of the quotes employed by Crosskey and others as evidence of a broader meaning actually use the term "commercial," not "commerce." Nelson and Pushaw repeatedly use the term "commercial" throughout their article as though it were synonymous with "commerce," and a great many of the sources on which they rely to establish the broader meaning of "commerce" actually use the term "commercial" instead.r " While it seems reasonable at first blush to think that both terms have the same meaning, the statement by Smith undercuts this assumption by explicitly using "commercial interests" to convey a broader meaning than the term "commerce."' ' In sum, the original meaning of the regulatory 80 The same is true of Chancellor Livingston's argument that:
Some gentlemen suppose that, to understand and provide for the general interests of commerce and manufactures, our legislators ought to know how all commodities are produced, from the first principle of vegetation to the last polish of mechanical labor, that they ought to be minutely acquainted with all the process of all the arts. If this were true, it would be necessary that a great part of the British House of Commons should be woollen-drapers; yet we seldom find such characters in that celebrated assembly. Id at 275.
81 Id at 245 (emphasis added). 82 See, for example, Nelson and Pushaw, 85 Iowa L Rev at 40 n 163 (cited in note 11) (citing Charles Pinckney's reference at the Constitutional Convention to the five -commercial interests" of the American states as including staple crops such as "wheat," "tobacco," and -Rice & Indigo," as well as "fisheries" and "trade" as evidence that he held a broad view of "commerce"). Pinckney's statement can be read as enumerating the different sources throughout the states of various articles of commerce. In no way does his list comprehend all gainful activities. In addition, I shall offer examples below showing that, to the contrary , Pinckney publicly used the term "commerce" in the narrow sense. See text accompanying notes 93-97. 83 Johnson's definition of "commercial" is: "Commercial: adj [from commerce]. Relating to commerce or traffick." Johnson, 1 A Dictionary of the English Language (cited in note 53). The pairing of "commerce" with "traffick" suggests that both "commerce" and "commercial" are be-powers granted to Congress might have been broader had Article I, Section 8 granted it the power "to regulate the commercial interests of the States" rather than the power to regulate only "commerce.
' '
The term "commerce" appears only eight times in the report of the Pennsylvania ratification convention. All uses are consistent with the narrow meaning of "commerce"; none clearly uses a broader meaning. Only three uses add any context t.o the term, and all are by James Wilson, a member of the Constitutional Convention and a person who Nelson and Pushaw claim understood the term "'commerce' as encompassing not merely the buying and selling of goods, but also antecedent production, labor-and-wage transactions, and related business services like insurance."' ' Wilson, they say, "used 'commerce' to describe all gainful activity.':' In the Philadelphia convention, however, Wilson referred to "the objects of commerce,"s" suggesting items being traded. Later he asked, "Is it not an important object to extend our manufactures and our commerce? This cannot be done, unless a proper security is provided for the regular discharge of contracts. This security cannot be obtained, unless we give the power of deciding upon those contracts to the general government." ' His most revealing comment suggesting a strong distinction between "commerce" and other economic activities was this:
Suppose we reject this system of government; what will be the consequence? Let the farmer say, he whose produce remains unasked for; nor can he find a single market for its consumption, ing used in the narrow sense. In the North Carolina debates, "commerce" is mentioned eighteen times (including two times in proposed amendments). Like elsewhere, there is no clear use of it in any sense broader than "trade" or "exchange," and there are a few clear examples of its use in the narrow sense in speeches by William Davie. Davie defined the "general objects of the union" to be "1st, to protect us against foreign invasion; 2d, to defend us against internal commotions and insurrections; 3d, to promote the commerce, agriculture, and manufactures, of America." ' O Later, he explained why the regulation of commerce, though distinct from agriculture and manufacturing, promoted them: "Commerce, sir, is the nurse of both. The merchant furnishes the planter with such articles as he cannot manufacture himself, and finds him a market for his produce. Agriculture cannot flourish if commerce languishes; they are mutually dependent on each other."" And, Davie also distinguished between the interests "of agriculture and commerce" and how the Constitution would protect just claims of "the merchant or farmer."" ' Merchants were those who bought and sold goods; it was they, not farmers or artisans, who engaged in commerce.
In the reports of the South Carolina convention, the word "commerce" is used twenty-six times. Charles Pinckney, who had been a delegate to the Constitutional Convention and whose use of the term "commercial interests" Nelson and Pushaw cite as evidence of a broad meaning of the term "commerce,', equated "the regulation of commerce" and mere "privileges with regard to shipping," when he asked, " by discussing the different "classes" of society comprised of the "commercial men," the "professional men," those engaged in "the mechanical," and the "landed interest-the owners and cultivators of the soil." ' And although he contended that all the other classes should be subservient to the promotion of the last, he defended commerce from the criticism that it was "generally cheating."' No other use of the term connoted a broader meaning of "commerce"; all uses were entirely compatible with the terms "trade" or "exchange."
Virginia wins the prize for the most mentions of the word: seventy-four. Here, as elsewhere, there is not a single instance of "commerce" being used unambiguously in the broader sense. To the contrary, the most striking evidence is the dominance of a conception of commerce that is even narrower than "trade" or "exchange"-also manifested by Pinckney's reference in the South Carolina debates to "privileges with regard to shipping.' In Virginia, I count at least seventeen references that link "commerce" in some way to ports, shipping, navigation, or the "carrying trades." In other words, on these occasions, the term "commerce" is limited to conveying or transporting the articles of trade, rather than to the entire act of trading. ' For example, Richard Henry Lee asked those who doubted the need for the Constitution to "go to our seaports; let him see our commerce languishing-not an American bottom to be seen."'" Edmund Randolph urged members to "[c]ast your eyes to your seaports: see how commerce languishes." 10 ' He observed that "Virginia is in a very unhappy position with respect to the access of foes by sea, though happily situated for commerce,"' and that "[a]s it is the spirit of commercial nations to engross as much as possible the carrying trade, this makes it necessary to defend our commerce."" Like Lee and Randolph, Francis Corbin also referred to those ports
96
Id at 321-22. This usage also suggests that "commercial" could be used in a narrow as well as a broad sense.
97 Id at 322 (stating that "there are some kinds of commerce not only fair and valuable, but such as ought to be encouraged by government").
98
See text accompanying note 94. 99 On the other hand, these usages could be construed as somewhat expanding the scope of "commerce" to include trade and exchange "as well as," in the words of Justice Thomas, "transporting for these purposes." Lopez, 514 US at 585. Even so expanded, however, the original meaning of "commerce" would not embrace agriculture, manufacturing, or other productive activity. I will discuss this at greater length below in the context of Gibbons v Ogden. See text accompanying notes 117-37.
Jonathan Elliot, ed, 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 43 (Taylor & Maury 2d ed 1863).
101 Id at 66.
where we had every reason to see the fleets of all nations, he will behold but a few trifling little boats; he will every where see commerce languish; the disconsolate merchant, with his arms folded, ruminating, in despair, on the wretched ruins of his fortune, and deploring the impossibility of retrieving it." M Future Chief Justice John Marshall asked whether "the Algerines ... and every other predatory or maritime nation, [cannot] pillage our ships and destroy our commerce, without subjecting themselves to any inconvenience?"""u Madison asserted that "American vessels, if they can do it with advantage, may carry on the commerce of the contending nations.""' William Grayson stated that the riches of all those "maritime powers of Europe ... come by sea. Commerce and navigation are the principal sources of their wealth.""' And, echoing Marshall, James Innes asked, "Is it not in the power of any maritime power to seize our vessels, and destroy our commerce, with impunity?"' I present all these quotes not to show that the original meaning of the term "commerce" was limited to shipping. Surely shipping was so closely identified with commerce because it was at that time the indispensable means for the movement of goods. One could easily extend this preoccupation with what is now called the "channels and instrumentalities" of commerce to railroads, canals, and air transport. But this close connection reinforces the narrow meaning of commerce and the purpose for granting Congress the power to regulate it. It also explains why the earliest cases involving the commerce power had to do with boats."9 Moreover, these were not the only references to "commerce" in Virginia. Others of the sort I have canvassed from elsewhere appear here as well. Edmund Pendleton, for instance, viewed "commerce" as the means by which "the people may have an opportunity of disposing of their crops at market, and of procuring such supplies as they may be in want of-."' ' . So synonymous was "commerce" with "trade" that William Grayson worried that "the whole commerce of the United States may be exclusively carried on by merchants residing within the Despite the strength and consistency of all this evidence, it is also true that persons participating in the process of drafting and ratifying the Constitution frequently used the phrase "trade and commerce. ' This, in the absence of the evidence already presented, might suggest that these terms were not identical." 3 On the other hand, if "commerce" is given its broadest connotation as "gainful activity," it would include "trade" within its meaning, and this phrase would still make little sense. Instead, it appears that the phrase "trade and commerce" was something of a couplet like "cease and desist" or, as they say in Disney World, a "full and complete" stop. The couplet "trade and commerce" refers to a single activity that could be, and usually was, called either trade or commerce. Indeed, on two occasions, state convention delegates referred to the power to "regulate trade" rather than to the power to regulate "commerce.'" Should there be any doubt about my interpretation of these statements, go back to the quotes in which there is a context provided and replace the term "commerce" with the term "gainful activity." All of these sentences would be rendered incoherent. Nor are these statements to be dismissed, as Crosskey would have us do,'" because they occur in partisan debate. Remember, we are not asking what purposes or intentions are being expressed by these delegates. We are just asking how they used the term "commerce." So far as these records permit us to judge, there is no conflict over the meaning of this term among the otherwise divided participants in these conventions.
From these findings, we can conclude that if anyone in the Constitutional Convention or the state ratification conventions used the term "commerce" to refer to something more comprehensive than "trade" or "exchange," they either failed to make explicit that meaning or their comments were not recorded for posterity. The evidence ventions at 70 (cited in note 90) ("[1It was well known he was for giving power to Congress to regulate the trade of the United States."). It is possible, though I think implausible given the context, to infer that these two speakers were advocating a power narrower than the power to regulate "commerce." that survives is entirely consistent on this point and confirms the observation made by Madison late in his life that "[i]f, in citing the Constitution, the word trade was put in the place of commerce, the word foreign made it synonymous with commerce. Trade and commerce are, in fact, used indiscriminately, both in books and in conversation." ' 
B. Judicial Interpretations of Commerce, 1824-1935
Thirty-five years after ratification, in the 1824 case of Gibbons v Ogden, ' John Marshall was called upon to decide whether navigation was included in the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the states."" He held that it was. From the perspective of original intent, this holding is unremarkable. The above sources, and others unmentioned, "9 make clear the intention to subject shipping and navigation to the regulation of Congress. The interpretive challenge is in determining exactly how, if at all, navigation is included in the original meaning of the text. Was it a part of the term "commerce" itself?. Or was the regulation of navigation incidental to the regulation of commerce and therefore authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause? Then there is always the possibility that the framers used words the original meaning of which did not accurately express their intentions, and so they failed to include a power over "navigation" though they believed they had.
While the sources I have examined do not provide indisputable answers to these questions, on balance, I think navigation appears to be included within the meaning of the term "commerce" because of its intimate connection to the activity of trading. Indeed, as was noted earlier, the etymology of the term "commerce" is "with" (corn) "merchandise" (merci),'2 a phrase that could accurately be applied to the "carrying trade," which is how the object of navigation laws was frequently described."' Perhaps the strongest evidence that "commerce" 
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HeinOnline --68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 125 2001 included navigation is in Article I, Section 9, where Congress is forbidden from enacting any "Regulation of Commerce" that gives preference "to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another. ' ' .. Though regulations concerning imports that might favor one port over another could be considered simply rules governing trade or exchange, laws governing the movement of vessels, the enactment of which are partially restricted by this clause, would appear to be rules concerning navigation or the transportation of articles of commerce.
In the Philadelphia convention, the extensive debate over whether "navigation acts" should require a supermajority occurred explicitly in the context of the power to regulate commerce." For instance, John Rutledge of South Carolina contended that "[i]t did not follow from a grant of the power to regulate trade, that it would be abused. At the worst a navigation act could bear hard a little while only on the S[outhern] States.' 2 . The sort of navigation act contemplated here was an "act encouraging american bottoms & seamen ' that would incidentally raise the price of freight 6 and so impact adversely exporting interests.
Moreover, there is a hint that the term "commerce" included navigation in the fact that-like "commerce and trade"-the couplet "commerce and navigation" appears, by my count, four times during the ratification debates, twice in Massachusetts and twice in Virginia.' 2 ' On two of these occasions, "commerce and navigation" was distin-
guished from "various branches of business thereon dependent '' l as well as specifically from agriculture. ' "Even expanded to include navigation or transportation, then, commerce is still distinguishable from 122 US Const Art 1, § 9, cl 6. 129 Id at 83 (statement of Mr. Bowdoin of Massachusetts referring to "a decrease of our commerce and navigation, and the duties and revenue arising from them. Hence an insufficient demand for the produce of our lands, and the consequent discouragement of agriculture.").
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HeinOnline --68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 126 2001 production. If the public at the time of ratification understood the term "commerce" in the Constitution to include trade, exchange, and navigation, then that is its original meaning. ' On the other hand, though enactment of "navigation laws" was widely thought to be within the power of Congress, several statements suggest that such laws were considered by some at least to be distinct from regulations of commerce and that the term "navigation" was neither synonymous with nor subsumed within the term "commerce;'The Virginia and North Carolina ratification conventions formally proposed that the Constitution be amended to state: "That no navigation law, or law regulating commerce, shall be passed without the consent of two thirds of the members present, in both houses.."" This proposed amendment both assumes that Congress has power to pass navigation laws and distinguishes such laws from regulations of commerce. If this and other like evidence is accepted, the admitted power to pass navigation laws is most accurately conceived as an implied power that was embraced by the Necessary and Proper Clause. In which case, the congressional power to regulate transportation is proper only insofar as it is necessary to effectuate the regulation of trade and exchange between state and state. Even statements warmly supporting the enactment of navigation laws suggest that such laws were thought a necessary means to protect commerce rather than the regulation of 130 Another possibility that would bring navigation under the rubric of -commerce" would be if "commerce" referred to the trade and exchange of goods andservices.Transportation would have been one of the very few, if not the only, services of that era that would operate between state and state. (Postal services might have been another, but Congress was given the power to enter this business itself by establishing post offices and post roads, US Coast Art 1, § 8. cl 7.) Services that are produced wholly within a state and then marketed or sold to citizens of other states might also be considered "commerce ... among the several States" in the same way that .commerce" includes the selling of goods that are wholly produced within a state. Under this interpretation, though Congress under the Commerce Clause could not properly regulate production of such services, like the production of goods, their marketing between states might be. I find no evidence from the records surrounding the drafting and ratification of the Constitution. however, to support this meaning. The only specific examples of commerce mentioned concern goods, in particular the produce of agriculture and manufacturing. Moreover, though the term "services" appears frequently in the records of the Philadelphia and ratification conventions, it is almost always in reference to the services of government officials and most often %Yhen discussing whether such services should be compensated. It is doubtful that, just because they were compensated, elected officials were commonly thought to be engaged in "commerce." Finally. and perhaps most persuasively, commerce is repeatedly characterized as being the activity of merchants who sell, exchange, or barter goods, not those who exchange their services for money. Both "commerce" and "merchant" have the same root, "mere," chich refers to "merci" or merchandise. See commerce itself. As Edmund Randoph observed to the Virginia convention:
As it is the spirit of commercial nations to engross as much as possible the carrying trade, this makes it necessary to defend our commerce. But how shall we compass this end? England has arisen to the greatest height, in modern times, by her navigation act, and other excellent regulations. The same means would produce the same effects. ' But even this statement could be read as including navigation in the definition of "commerce."
In Gibbons, Marshall reached his conclusion that navigation was included in the term "commerce" by relying on the definition of "commerce" as "intercourse." 3 This was indeed the first definition of "commerce" offered in Johnson's dictionary. " Johnson, however, defines "intercourse" as "1. Commerce; exchange" and "2. Communication: followed by with," 35 so it is not at all clear that the meaning of "intercourse" (especially when not "followed by with") was itself much broader than trade and exchange. ' " Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that John Marshall, much less the founders, believed that the term "commerce" in the Constitution embraced noncommercial intercourse or every form of intercourse. Though the term "intercourse" appears sixty-three times in the records of the ratification debates (sometimes with a broader meaning), on each of the six times it is used in conjunction with "commercial," it is a clear reference to foreign trade-though these examples of usage might also be broad enough to include transport for purposes of trade." And while "inter-
The Original Meanizg of the Commerce Clause course" sometimes had a broader meaning, we must never forget that the Constitution speaks of "commerce" not the "regulation of intercourse" among the states.
During the Progressive Era, the Supreme Court rejected a broad conception of commerce as embracing any gainful activity in favor of the more limited conception of commerce as "trade and exchange" that is so uniformly reflected in the surviving records of the drafting and ratification of the Constitution (though it never hesitated to sanction the power of Congress to regulate the instrumentalities of commerce as well as commerce itself). Beginning with the 1895 case of United States v E.C. Knight CoM and up to the 1936 case of Carter v Carter Coal Co, o ' the Court drew a distinction between "production"-such as manufacturing, agriculture, or mining-and "commerce" or trade in the things produced. As Chief Justice Fuller wrote in E.C. Knight: "Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it .... The fact that an article is manufactured for export to another State does not of itself make it an article of interstate commerce.'tAnd in Carter Coal, Justice Sutherland defined "commerce" as "the equivalent of the phrase 'intercourse for the purpose of trade.'""' "Mining" he explained, "brings the subject matter of commerce into existence. Commerce disposes of it.""' Sutherland's definition harkens back to Marshall's use of "intercourse" without the unwarranted suggestion that "commerce" embraces every form of intercourse. It also seems a reasonable definition of the term "commercial intercourse.""' Using this distinction, the power of Congress to regulate the economy was sharply restricted. It is no surprise, therefore, that these decisions were roundly condemned by political and academic proponents of national control of the entire economy." As was to be expected, the Court was criticized for its failure to acknowledge that the tions. See Elliot, ed, 3 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 344 (cited in note 100) (statement of Mr. Monroe of Virginia referring to "a commercial intercourse between the United States and Spain"); id at 365 (statement of Mr. Corbin of Virginia referring to treaties "being a regulation of commercial intercourse between different nations"); Elliot, ed, 4 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 119 (cited in note 90) (statement of Mr. Davie of North Carolina referring to "that commercial intercourse, which, founded on the universal protection of private property, has, in a measure, made the world one nation"); id at 221 (statement of Mr. Iredell of North Carolina that: "At the beginning of the late war with Great Britain, the Parliament thought proper to stop all commercial intercourse with the American provinces.").
M3 156 US 1 (holding that the Sherman Act did not apply to manufacturing trusts). 139 298 US 238, 298 (1936) (ruling that Congress could not regulate the conditions under which coal is produced before it became an article of commerce).
140 156 US at 12-13.
meaning of the Constitution must evolve to meet changing circumstance." More surprisingly, however, in light of the historical evidence presented here that strongly supports its usage, the Court was also harshly criticized for distorting the original meaning of "commerce."
C. Academics Dispute the Original Meaning of Commerce
In their influential little book, The Power to Govern: The Constitution-Then and Now, published in 1937, Walton Hamilton and Douglass Adair castigate the Court for imposing its conception of commerce on the founding generation in defiance of the historical understanding. "A narrowing of the concept 'commerce,"' they confidently assert, "is at odds with [the Fathers'] contemporary usage."' 4 ' 6 But though they pick quotes from the ratification debates reflecting the demand for stronger national governance, they reveal little of the evidence of usage also to be found there' or in the notes of the Philadelphia convention that I have summarized here. Instead, they rely primarily on five pages of quotes from a pamphlet by Tench Coxe, written before the Constitutional Convention, in which he argues for a sweeping national control over the economy and on Hamilton's 1791 Report on Manufactures, which Coxe is reputed to have helped draft.
Hamilton, it will be recalled, proposed to the Constitutional Convention a plan of government in which the legislature would have the "power to pass all laws whatsoever ' ,3 subject only to a negative by the President. His plan was never considered, and a general grant of powers to the Congress was rejected by the Convention in favor of an enumeration. 9 Yet for the rest of his career, Hamilton never wavered in his efforts on behalf of expanding the power of the national government. Despite this, when he wrote in The Federalist Papers, when he spoke at the New York ratification convention, and in his opinion supporting the constitutionality of a national bank, Hamilton used the word "commerce" in its ordinary narrow sense."O 145 Id at 191-94.
146 Id at 181.
147 But see id at 163 (quoting William Davie's reference to "commerce, agriculture, and manufactures of America" and his assertion that "Commerce, sir, is the nurse of both" without commenting on the distinction explicit in Davie's usage).
148 Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the Federal Convention at 291 (cited in note 112).
The Original Meaning of die Commerce Clause
In 1953, this originalist criticism of the Supreme Court's definition of "commerce" during the Progressive Era was picked up and greatly expanded by William Crosskey in his massive book, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States" Space prevents me from considering in any detail Crosskey's indictment of the Progressive Era Court's Commerce Clause doctrines and of anyone else who disagreed with his conception of national power-especially James Madison, whom Crosskey repeatedly and without foundation accused of fabricating his notes of the debates in the Constitutional Convention."' Like Adair and Douglass, Crosskey studiously avoids consulting the Philadelphia or state conventions for evidence of usage, focusing instead on an extensive canvass of pre-revolutionary and preConstitutional sources, such as John Dickinson's 1765 pamphlet, The Late Regulations Respecting the British Colonies Considered (which was written at a time when the plenary power of England to govern the affairs of the colonies was politically difficult to question).'" I am not disputing here that "commerce" had a broad as well as a narrow meaning,' or that many before and after the Constitution strongly favored a national government powerful enough to govern all "gainful activities." I only dispute, on the basis of the evidence of usage presented here and the clash of interests that existed in the country at the time, that a government of so unlimited a power was adopted in 1789. And it is striking the degree to which these authors, whose tone is nothing if not self-righteous towards those who do not share their views, completely ignore the evidence of usage that the records of the drafting and ratification process reveal. 151 See note 16. 1-2 See, for example, Crosskey, 1 Politics and the Constitution at 12-13 (cited in note 28) (Madison's notes "cannot be accepted as a complete and wholly truthful account of the matters they purport to record" and are "misleading:'). Crosskey's baseless charges are repeated with increasing intensity throughout his study, but, though he promised to substantiate them in a later work, he never did. '54 Though I confess that my examination of the evidence of usage during the drafting and ratification of the Constitution has now made me somewhat skeptical of the contrary claim that "commerce" (as distinct from "commercial") was used more broadly outside that context.
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Even supposing these critics are right to maintain that "commerce" has a meaning as broad as any "gainful activity," however, the implications of adopting this broader meaning may be less than is commonly believed. As I shall discuss next, the reach of even a broad conception of "commerce" is confined by the meaning of the rest of the clause-that is, by the phrases "among the several States" and "To regulate.". a) The Text. Textual analysis of the Commerce Clause strongly supports a conclusion that the phrase "among the several States" refers to "between people of different states." If this phrase included commerce between people of the same state that takes place wholly within a single state, the Commerce Clause would then embrace all commerce. This interpretation would render the phrase "among the several States" superfluous. The only reason for adding "among the several States" (and with foreign nations and Indian tribes) is to exclude some type of commerce from the power of Congress. Therefore, barring some extrinsic evidence that suggests another plausible possibility, we can safely conclude that the original meaning of "among the several States" to those who used and heard this phrase in the Constitution was commerce that occurred, in Hamilton's words, "between the States." 5 Usage confirms this.
b) The Federalist Papers. In Federalist 42, Madison clarifies that the purpose of the power to regulate commerce "among the several States" was to manage trade between people of different states and facilitate the essential power of regulating trade with foreign nations:
The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the commerce between its several members is in the number of those which have been clearly pointed out by experience.... [W]ithout this supplemental provision, the great and essential power of foreseen that ways would be found out to load the articles of import and export, during the passage through their jurisdiction, with duties which would fall on the makers of the latter and the consumers of the former.L " In no way would such a power reach purely intrastate activities, whether gainful or not, a point that he emphasized again in Federalist 45:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State!"' Trade "between the States" was a usage that Hamilton would continue to employ when referring to the Commerce Clause while advocating, in his opinion to President Washington, that Congress had the power to incorporate a national bank."' Both the meaning of the term and the well-known purpose of the clause were made clear by Hamilton in The Federalist Papers. Under the Articles of Confederation, the states had "fettered, interrupted and narrowed"' ' the flow of commerce from one state to another by protective legislation of all sorts. Apart from the need to negotiate treaties of commerce with other nations, the principal purpose for adopting a new Constitution was to deprive the states of the power to interfere with productive exchanges. See also id at 293 ("The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power, but that seems to be an addition which few oppose and from which no apprehensions are entertained.").
An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance the trade of each by an interchange of their respective productions, not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation to foreign markets. The veins of commerce in every part will be replenished and will acquire additional motion and vigor from a free circulation of the commodities of every part. Commercial enterprise will have much greater scope from the diversity in the productions of different States. When the staple of one fails from a bad harvest or unproductive crop, it can call to its aid the staple of another. The variety, not less than the value, of products for exportation contributes to the activity of foreign commerce. It can be conducted upon much better terms with a large number of materials of a given value than with a small number of materials of the same value, arising from the competitions of trade and from the fluctuations of markets.' 2 c) The ratification debates. In the New York convention, John Lansing, who had been a delegate in Philadelphia, praised the Commerce Clause and complained about "[t]he languishing situation of our commerce [that] has also been attributed to the impotence of Congress." ' ' He then asserted that "all the states, excepting two, had passed laws to enable Congress to regulate commerce, and that those two were not indisposed to vest that power." ' Lansing was referring here to the 1784 Act of Congress asking the states for the power to regulate the trade between different states.' In no way did this proposed act reach commerce or trade that laid solely within any state. ' Finally, the silence from the southern states during ratification supports this interpretation. It can be asserted with certainty that the southern states would never have ratified the Constitution if the power to regulate commerce among the states included the power to regulate the slave trade within a particular state, which was unquestionably and reprehensibly thought to be a form of commerce.'" In my view, asking whether a particular meaning would have been agreed to by one group or another is not the best indication of the original meaning of any constitutional provision. At issue should be the public meaning of the term to which they did agree. Nonetheless, when supported by other types of evidence of original meaning, the fact that the slave trade was considered outside the power of Congress to regulate commerce "among the several States" bolsters our understanding of that phrase's public meaning.
d) Other commentators. Although this interpretation of "among the states" has been contested, most vigorously by William Crosskey," ' there remains a scholarly and judicial consensus in favor of this as the original meaning. ' 6 Consistent with the scheme of federalism that motivated the granting of a power to regulate commerce among the states to Congress, trade that occurs wholly within a state was not commerce "among the states" and, therefore, the regulation of such commerce was not among the powers of Congress. As professor and jurist St. George Tucker, one of the earliest scholarly expositors on the Constitution, explained: "The constitution of the United States does not authorise congress to regulate, or in any manner to interfere with, the domestic commerce of any state."" ' Tucker offered as an example of such intrastate commerce, "a vessel wholly employed in that domestic commerce, seems not to be subject to the control of the laws of the United States."' 70 Tucker allowed that federal law could punish or seize the vessels of persons who gave "aid or assistance to any fraudulent commerce, either with foreign parts, or between the states"'" Congress "may also prescribe, or limit the terms and conditions upon which vessels may be permitted to trade with foreign parts, or with other states." But, citing the Tenth Amendment, Tucker concluded that Congress, under its power to regulate commerce among the states, has trade with other nations).
"no constitutional right to control the intercourse between any two or more parts of the same state. '' ' 2. The original meaning of "among the states" independently limits the federal commerce power.
Adopting the narrower meaning of "among the several States" also reduces the significance of whether "commerce" is interpreted broadly to include any gainful activity or limited only to trade or exchange, For if Congress can only regulate gainful activity that takes place between people of different states, even the broader definition of commerce will not encompass much more than trade or exchange.
Thus, supposing the Progressive Era courts were wrong to exclude manufacturing, agriculture, and mining from the category of "commerce," they were on to something nonetheless. It is hard even to imagine either a good being manufactured or a crop being grown "among the states" or "between state and state" unless the factory or farm physically straddles a state line. Of course, when a company that manufactures goods or raises crops then sells them or transports them for gain from one state to another, this aspect of its operation is commerce "among the states" under even the narrow definition of commerce and is subject to federal regulation. Thus, ordinarily, manufacturing, agriculture, and mining-even when "commercial" in the broadest sense-do not occur between states and therefore are outside the regulatory powers of Congress.
I say "ordinarily" because one can imagine industrial, agricultural, or mining processes which, though otherwise within a state, extend beyond that state by emitting harmful substances into the air or water that are carried into neighboring states, like one can imagine a person standing in Indiana and shooting a bullet into Illinois. Therefore, just as the regulation of a shipment of products to other states is "proper" under the Commerce Clause, the "commercial" production of harmful emissions that cross state lines would be included under the broader definition of "commerce." Of course, the fact that one aspect of a business is subject to regulation does not then mean that all its activities are then appropriately regulated. Only commerce that occurs "among the several States" is subject to congressional regulation. In such cases, then, adopting a conception of "commerce" as including all "gainful activity" would be significant even though manufacturing, agriculture, and mining usually occur within a single state.
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impact upon commerce that does cross state lines. The issue here is whether Congress's power under the Commerce Clause extends to commerce that occurs wholly within one state but still can be said to "concern" more states than one. The original meaning of "among the several States" provides no warrant for this extension of power.
Determining whether a particular regulation of activity that is not "commerce ... among the several States" -that is, trade between state and state-is constitutional requires an assessment not only of the Commerce Clause but of the Necessary and Proper Clause as well. This is not the place to discuss fully the original meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause.'' Suffice it to say that the requirement of "necessity" requires a showing, not merely an assertion, of means-end fit, while "propriety" requires a showing that the exercise of power lies properly within the jurisdiction of Congress. As summarized by Gary Lawson and Patricia Granger:
In view of the limited character of the national government under the Constitution, Congress's choice of means to execute federal powers would be constrained in at least three ways: first, an executory law would have to conform to the "proper" allocation of authority within the federal government; second, such a law would have to be within the "proper" scope of the federal government's limited jurisdiction with respect to the retained prerogatives of the states; and third, the law would have to be within the "proper" scope of the federal government's limited jurisdiction with respect to the people's retained rights. In other words, 181 I began this inquiry in Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 UCLA L Rev 745 (1997) (distinguishing the Madisonian from Marshallian conceptions of necessity). Since that article was published I have come to think that the two sides of this controversy were not as far apart as is commonly believed. On one side, Madison rejected a conception of necessity as "in- takable: incidental authority must not be so broadly construed as to subvert the basic principle that Congress has limited powers."). What most divided them was a combination of (a) the degree of means-end fit that must be shown, (b) whether the bank met the requisite degree of fit, and (c) the degree of judicial deference that was appropriate. I will present this evidence at greater length in The Presumption of Liberty: Natural Rights and the Constitution. ... executory laws must be consistent with principles of separation of powers, principles of federalism, and individual rights.' 2 My objective in this Article is not to define precisely the incidental powers of Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause to reach activity that is not commerce, or is commerce that is not between state and state. My goal is only to define as precisely as the evidence permits the original meaning of "commerce," "among the several States," and "To regulate" in the face of judicial and academic disagreement about the meaning of these terms. For knowing the scope of these terms is the first essential step towards determining if some other power is really incidental to and for the purpose of the regulation of commerce among the states.
B. The Meaning of "To regulate"
1. The power to regulate does not generally include the power to prohibit.
Samuel Johnson defines "to regulate" as "1. To adjust by rule or method.... 2. To direct."' In other words, the term "to regulate" means "to make regular." The power to regulate is, in essence, the power to say, "if you want to do something, here is how you must do it." For example, the making of contracts and wills are "regulated" by the law of contracts and estates. To make an enforceable agreement for a sale of goods over five hundred dollars requires that the agreement be in writing. To make a will requires a specified number of witnesses to one's signature. These requirements regulate-or "make regular"-the making of contracts and wills by subjecting them to a rule or method.The power to regulate the making of contracts or wills is not the power to prohibit such activity, even though contracts or wills that do not conform to the regulation are necessarily unenforceable. A pure regulation of commerce, then, is a set of rules that tells people, "If you want to trade or exchange with others, here is how you must go about it."
In contrast, Johnson defines "to prohibit" as "1. To forbid; to interdict by authority.... 2.To debar; to hinder."4 Forbidding, interdicting, and hindering are not the same thing as regulating, or "making regular," or adjusting by rule or method. It does not tell you how to do something, but instead tells you that you may not do it at all. And in Johnson's dictionary, neither "to regulate" nor "to prohibit" is defined in terms of the other; each seems quite distinct. Indeed, both terms appear in the Constitution and the context in which they are used suggests that their meanings sharply differ.
Apart from the Commerce Clause, the terms "regulate" or "regulation" appear seven other times in the body of the Constitution and three times in the amendments proposed by Congress to the states, though only once in the Bill of Rights as ratified. The term "prohibit" is used once in the body of the Constitution and twice in the Bill of Rights. Article I, Section 4 gives Congress the power to "alter such Regulations""' on the time, place, and manner of elections prescribed by state legislatures. Clearly, the power to regulate or facilitate elections is not the power to prohibit them. Article I, Section 8 gives Congress the power "[t]o... regulate the Value""' of money, not to prohibit the use of money or to "regulate" its value to zero.
In two places the Constitution makes an explicit distinction between prohibition and regulation. Article III, Section 2 gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, "with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.""7 By distinguishing "exceptions" from "regulations," the Constitution distinguished Congress's power to regulate or subject to rule the Court's appellate jurisdiction and its power to prohibit the Court from exercising its jurisdiction by making "exceptions" thereto. If the power to make regulations included the power to prohibit that which is regulated, there would have been no need to give explicit power to Congress to make "exceptions" to appellate jurisdiction.
That the Constitution does not adopt the broader meaning of regulation as "to govern" is also reflected in Article I, Section 8, which gives Congress the power "[tjo make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."' ' . Here, the term "government" is coupled with "regulation" in a manner that makes clear that Congress has complete power to command or govern the army and navy, not merely the power to regulate them.
Less clear, but still consistent with the distinction between "To regulate" and "to govern," is Congress's power in Article IV, Section 3 "to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States".'..
Congress clearly has the power to govern the territories, and the term "rules and regulations" suggests strongly that its powers are broader than merely regulatory, though it includes the power to make "regulations" as well as other needful "rules."
That the Constitution uses the term "to regulate" in this sense is made plain by the Second Amendment, the first portion of which reads, "A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State." ' A "well-regulated" militia is not a prohibited militia but one that is well drilled."' Even those who read the Second Amendment as a "collective" rather than an individual right on the basis of this preface concede-indeed their theory requires them to insistthat the power to regulate the militia that the Constitution elsewhere confers upon Congress9 ' does not include the power to forbid or prohibit the militia. By their interpretation, the sole purpose of the Second Amendment was to protect the continued existence of the state militias.", By the same token, the power of Congress to "well-regulate" commerce among the states does not include the power to forbid or prohibit commerce.", James Madison described a direct parallel between the regulation of the militia and the regulation of commerce when he asked:
How can the trade between the different States be duly regulated without some knowledge of their relative situations in these and other points? ... How can uniform regulations for the militia be duly provided without a similar knowledge of some internal cir-the most important reason to grant Congress the power to regulate commerce was not the power to eliminate trade barriers among the several states (which Madison referred to as a "supplemental provision" ,), but the power to place restrictions on foreign access to American markets to facilitate the opening of European trade to Americans as well as to promote domestic production. Thus, it was envisioned that the power to regulate trade with foreign nations included the power to prohibit certain types of trade by means of, for example, tariffs.2 However, even if it is conceded that the original meaning of "To regulate" included a power to restrict foreign commerce in negotiating treaties to lower foreign barriers to American goods as well as to protect some domestic markets from foreign competition, this aspect of the power to regulate does not necessarily extend to domestic commerce. The Constitution expressly bars Congress from using any "Regulation of Commerce" to favor the ports of one state over those of another,7 and it mandates that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." 0 ' These provisions deny Congress the same degree of regulatory power over domestic commerce that it has over commerce with foreign nations. And they provide circumstantial textual evidence that the domestic portion of the Commerce Clause lacked the prohibitory aspect that was included in the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and was instead intended to eliminate and prevent any state-imposed barriers to trade between the states. 7 we must also consider the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause. If the original meaning of "proper" in this clause was, as Gary Lawson and Patricia Granger have shown, ' that the end or purpose of a law must be within the jurisdiction of Congress to enact, a narrow conception of the Commerce Clause limits Congress to the end or purpose of making regular the trade between the states. Legislation that is actually for a different purpose cannot be upheld as "proper." As Chief Justice John Marshall stated in McCulloch v Maryland,' "should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government, it would become the painful duty of this tribunal ... to say that such an act was not the law of the land." 27 And, as I have argued elsewhere," if the Necessary and Proper Clause requires an assessment of "necessity" in which legislation is scrutinized to determine if there is adequate fit between means and ends, then the Congress must show, at minimum, it has chosen means that actually conduce to an enumerated end. Even John Marshall, who construed the degree of necessity required by the clause more loosely than I think is warranted, allowed that the means chosen must be "plainly adapted" to a "legitimate" end that is "within the scope of the constitution." 2' 9 In which case, the only "appropriate means" ' are those that are actually incidental to making regular trade between the states. This all assumes, of course, that a court is bound by the original meaning of the Commerce Clause. I have argued elsewhere why it should be, so long as it professes a commitment to a written constitution. ' Moreover in recent years there has been a marked movement on the part of constitutional theorists in the direction of original meaning, at least to provide the starting point of constitutional analysis tm -in which case, the content of the starting point surely matters. But this is an argument for another place. What has been established here is that those who have claimed that the original meaning of the Commerce Clause was narrow are right and their critics are wrong.
